The Emergence of International Food Safety Standards and Guidelines: Understanding the current landscape through an historical approach.
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A surge of advice on food hygiene emerged in the postwar era when scientists and bureaucrats alike became involved in the process of trying to eliminate these threats to the food supply. Hygiene standards often took the material form of exhaustive lists, reports, charts, manuals, books and pamphlets -the precursors to today's electronic formats -which set limits on the maximum microbial counts permitted in the final product.
In addition to describing numerical limits and parameters, however, the standards would also advocate behavioural guidelines for anyone in contact with the food, for example control of hygiene habits of labourers who work in abbatoirs or prohibitions on the use of raw (e.g., unpasteurized) milk in cheese products. Dr. Betty Hobbs, a British bacteriologist and an internationally recognized authority on food poisoning and food hygiene, was just one of many experts doling out advice aimed at various audiences food safety standards starting in the 1960s, at a time when two different approaches to food hygiene were combining. One approach was to descriptively and qualitatively address behaviour and practices and infrastructure at all points along the food production continuum, for example, by reorganizing abbatoir layout, advocating the use of hair nets in factories, urging labourers to refrain from chewing gum or picking one's nose. The other approach involved the application of statistical methods to food safety problems, but mainly focusing quantitatively on the food product itself moreso than the entire food production continuum. Ultimately, both approaches were retained and blended together, but, as this paper will demonstrate, in the 1960s there was a clash within the Codex over these approaches, which showcases not only the different attitudes of the WHO and the FAO toward food hygiene, but also how these two 3 approaches drew upon and placed emphasis on different forms of expertise, which had consequences for both health protection and the food industry.
This discussion had two key features. First, the distinction between standardizing practices versus standardizing the food object itself presented pragmatic problems of enforcement within member states as well as varying degrees of burden upon industry and public health systems and thus prompted the Codex Alimentarius Commission to differentiate between Standards for "End Products" versus "Codes of Practice" (compare Boxes 1 and 2 with Box 3). The second feature of this discussion is marked by a shift from more qualitative descriptions to include standards that emphasize numerical parameters and employ statistical data in order to be deemed "scientifically correct". Implicit with this second feature is a contested meaning of safety and international endorsement of how to assess risk quantitatively. Through an historical analysis, it will be argued that food standards development represent a process of 'coproduction' -that is, standards can incorporate, represent and direct both the natural and social orders. The 'natural' order is that which is normally associated with the 'scientific' objective or rational knowledge, whereas the 'social' can come to mean a variety of "building blocks" -norms, politics, institutions, social practices, identity, culture, attitudes, values, beliefs. 2 An examination of the Codex food hygiene committee's work demonstrates how the production and construction of standards based on microbiological science and statistical evidence involves a parallel construction and consideration of the social order (e.g. the practices and behaviours that ensure good hygiene). In the Codex, the two could not be separated and it became apparent through work on establishing hygiene standards and attempting to curb the presence of microbes in food, that there was a difference between standardizing the food items and standardizing the practices which bring about a desired end. There were economic, 4 legal, social and political implications of conflating the two and this debate played out in the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene (CCFH) as discussed below.
BACKGROUND
The meaning of food hygiene is historically contingent. Anne Hardy has made the historiographic distinction that there are two types of illnesses associated with food: 1) one associated with adulteration (e.g. deliberate contamination, addition of foreign substances like chemicals); versus 2) the illness caused by foods which had undergone decomposition, putrefaction or decay -the products of which were once thought of as chemical toxins and called "ptomaines" in the 19 th C, and said to be the cause "ptomaine poisoning". 3 Alongside these older frameworks of food adulteration and The end of the Second World War marked a watershed for food poisoning and food safety standards, and hygiene problems intensified for several reasons. The increased industrialization of the food system in the 1950s and 1960s brought about the appearance of large-sized "factory" farms, particularly in North America and Western
Europe. These developments also meant that more food safety problems emerged as food travelled longer distances, and new technologies and hygiene measures were required to address these problems. 7 For example, frozen foods, which prior to WWII were sold only at "high prices in low volumes in fragmented markets", became the fastest growing food sector in the United States by the 1950s. 8 This increased scale and complexity of the food production system gave rise to greater incidence of Salmonellosis which was identified as a key concern in poultry and dairy sectors during this time ( Figure 2 ). Moreover, increased reporting of foodborne illnesses and emergence of surveillance networks for problems like salmonellosis, increased focus on the health of developing populations by international agencies, and increased worldwide trade, all meant that the time was ripe for coordinated international efforts in establishing food standards.
One way to combat this problem of controlling the microbe was to eliminate any 'subjective' qualitative descriptions of the hygiene standards, especially in the final product specifications. Enlisting biometricians was one way to do so and this is where the differences in opinion over the standards emerged between the major players.
Appealing to expert statistical knowledge is not novel; it has been well documented that For the Codex, however, the motivation behind many of its standards was the securing of developing countries' exports for reasons of both safety and the assurance of increased trade. When the Codex Europaeus (its regional predecessor group) linked up with the international Codex in the early 1960s, much of the tension around the decision to join forces was due to the issue of protecting both health and trade. These diverse interests had to be taken into account when constructing the hygiene standards, not just the health and trade aspects, but also the numerical inputs, statistical evidence, qualitative descriptions and behavioural practices that went into the finalized drafts sent to governments. Although statistics as a discipline and the use of statistical evidence in biomedical contexts had emerged earlier, the globalization of statistical techniques was helped along by the UN agencies: by the WHO through its monitoring and surveillance of global incidence of diseases like smallpox or malaria, and the FAO with its counting and surveying of the worldwide food supply and emphasis on nutritional data. 18 , 19 8
The conflict between the FAO and the WHO researchers was due in part to the identity of the different communities developing these standards. In a broader sense, statistical evidence (or as Porter says, "numbers, graphs and formulas" is also a strategy of communication that can "conveniently summarize a multitude of complex events and transactions [and behaviours]." 20 Moreover, a quantitative approach can be a "technology of distance" and the means by which "science has been constructed as a global network". 21 A quantitative approach in the international food hygiene context would also mean different roles and expertise required for public health and food safety.
In light of what statistical methods can represent, then, and given the intended goals and reach of the international Codex standards, quantitative approaches were seemingly a good match for the food hygiene standards work. Ultimately the qualitative approach to food hygiene was not completely eclipsed by a quantitative method, however; instead, the discussion fostered the blending of two outlooks and resulted in the refining notions of risk and how to measure it.
THE CODEX COMMITTEE ON FOOD HYGIENE
The The focus of the CCFH was not solely on the final product; rather, they described the entire process of food production, including methods, practices and behaviours. The standards, once fully elaborated, were thick documents giving the definition, storage requirements, plant and operational facilities, and 'end product description' ( Figure   3 ).The end product description was for the product that would go on the market so that it is ready for human consumption; this would be a mainly qualitative description.
Some of the CCFH end product specifications were slightly more specific, but emphasized the same basic message that the final object should be clean and free from harmful bits, as loosely defined (see Boxes 1& 2 for examples). "To the extent possible in good manufacturing practice the product should be free from objectionable matter including insects and insect parts, insect webbing, soil, sand, or stone fragments, faecal matter of any kind, human or animal hair, and free from fungal filaments (mold) to an extent indicative of decayed ingredients; The product should be free from any pathogen infectious to man and from any toxic substance originating from bacteria or fungi; Products with an equilibrium pH above 4.5 should have received a processing treatment sufficient to destroy all spores of Clostridium botulinium, unless growth of surviving spores would be permanently prevented by product characteristics other than pH."
The CCFH had been developing standards like these for a few years focussing on descriptive requirements and standard operating procedures, and also detailing hygienic steps to be taken at the processing or manufacturing stages of the food supply chain. By the mid-1960s, however, some controversies arose among some members of the CCFH and with the WHO particularly with regard to attempting to standardize behaviours or hygienic practices, rather than just the final food object for human consumption.
Moreover, a second key debate emerged over determining microbial counts in the final food product, and which sampling methods to employ, such as a statistical approach to microbial counts. The WHO increasingly insisted upon the input of biometricians and highlighted the role of biometricians in changing the shape of food safety and even went so far as to create its own expert food hygiene group independent of the Codex. Thus the work of the CCFH started to pose a problem for the push to establish international hygiene standards because it attempted to standardize behaviours and practices which would combat hygiene problems at all points along the food chain, rather than quantify microbial counts and methods of sampling that focused on the final (end) product.
CODES OF HYGIENIC PRACTICE
By the end of the 1960s, a "feeling of doubt and trouble" began to emerge in different countries and circles over accepting standards in the Codex Alimentarius -whether to adopt the standards for the final food object or the "Code of Principles" which one had to follow to produce a food object in a hygienic manner. 22 One of these circles included the International Dairy Federation (the IDF) a powerful industry lobby group based out of Belgium with an interest in hygiene standards for milk and milk products.
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The trouble was that Codex standards were intended -and according to its statutes mandatory -for adoption among member states, and the onus would be on them to integrate the standards into their respective national legislation governing matters of public health and agriculture.
This was not the first time that Codes of Practice were attempted; about a decade earlier in 1956 the WHO and FAO joined forces as a joint "Committee of Government
Experts" to establish a Code of Principles on Milk and Milk Products, governing such matters as methods of sampling and methods for the determination of fat contents or acidity in fluid and dried milks. This teamwork was one of the key inspirations to expand the international food standards program into the broader Codex. 23 The IDF had worked closely with the two agencies (WHO and FAO) on these earlier principles,
and it was recognized that the principles could not be mandatory, but instead provide guidance to those in "warm weather countries" and those at a "low stage of technical development." This milk team argued that:
"One of the major problems faced by the Committee stems from the wide variety of local situations in the world. While the same general principles are basic to dairy hygiene the world over, the methods by which these principles are to be applied must vary greatly from one country to another. This is particularly true with respect to those countries which are in the early stages of developing a milk programme, and where the nutritional needs of the population require the production and salvaging of as much milk as possible. Under primitive conditions, it is difficult if not impossible to apply the hygienic practices which are utilized in the more highly-developed countries." 24 The work of the CCFH was under scrutiny because it had come to the attention of the IDF and the larger Commission "that some of its subsidiary bodies were considering the elaboration, or were in fact elaborating, "international codes of practice" rather than standards." 25 A code of practice dealt with matters which were not strictly specifications or requirements for the foods themselves, (e.g. definition of terms, guiding principles, lists of commercial units), and their integration into national legislation would pose challenges to individual governments. Legislating international behaviours (for example, the wearing of hair nets, or gloves, on the abbatoir killing floor, or banning chewing gum in the kitchen) presents obvious problems for monitoring and enforcing these behaviours. And moreover, the cost of implementing recommended infrastructure (like stainless steel countertops, or elaborate irrigation systems on farms) was costly for member states, and impossible for some developing countries.
There were broader consequences for trade as well: For example, by 1969 U.K.
veterinary inspectors had advised the U.K. not to accept meat from Paraguay, Uruguay and Northern Argentina, complaining that its refrigeration transport containers ("frigorificas") were not up to par, admitting that the "whole subject in the UK is a mixture of animal health, hygiene from the human health point of view and certainly domestic politics." 26 This "mixture" was also causing "headaches" for Australia, as the U.S Inspectors were also starting to question its meat handling practices.
Attempting to lay down "internationally acceptable" basic hygiene requirements was thus an attempt at a "common understanding" yet the FAO recognized that in this field there would "always be an area of judgment which can only be exercised by qualified veterinarians." 27 At the same time, however, and perhaps adding to the complexity of standardizing hygiene practices, the "purchaser" will always have the "last word".
What the Codex hoped for was a common understanding at least between importer and exporter, but the CCFH kept running into problems, as hygiene practices were needed along the entire food production chain. In many cases member states would have to anticipate such contingencies, and,
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"provisions were needed which would deal with hygiene practices all along the course which the initial raw material has to follow in order to become a food for final consumption. Such hygiene aspects would cover all aspects of the handling of the raw material -be it the growing or harvesting of fish on board fishing vessels -the process and manufacturing of the raw material and the transportation and storage as well as the distribution of the final product." 28 Because it was obvious that "a standard could not exhaustively provide for all contingencies which would cause a food either to become the carrier or the origin of a disease" the complaint from the IDF called into question the first 10 years of the Codex work.
To solve this problem, the legal counsels of both the WHO and the FAO were brought in for advice, and it was recommended that the Codes of principles or "Codes of Collectively, the ICMSF produced a monograph and series of volumes on microorganisms in foods and how to count them, which became very influential worldwide and adopted in universities for teaching purposes. 31 The first edition of Microorganisms Even before this meeting the ICMSF decided that:
"Assuming some agreement on 'standards' the committee will again meet with the biometricans. If sampling plans have been recommended, these will be referred to the biometricians for comment; if not, then appropriate data and proposals for 'standards'
will be offered to the biometricians and their advice sought." 32 The sampling plans themselves were very detailed and relied upon concepts of sample size, probability, population estimates, the use of lots and batches and coding systems, and the value "c": the maximum allowable number of microbes found in a product.
These numerical values were specific to the microbe and specific to the food product (e.g. for salmonella, "c" had to be relatively lower, if not "0" depending upon the food it is found in). 33 (See Figure 4 .)
The increased reliance upon biometrical approaches to microbial food issues clashed This debate was occurring at time when the idea of taking a systems approach to foodby monitoring the relative risks along a production chain -was gaining more currency.
In the early 1960s, the United States Nautical and Space Association (NASA) had enlisted the help of the Pillsbury food company to create its Hazard Analysis Criticial
Control Point (HACCP) system for space missions. 35 HACCP applied engineering principles of "Critical Control Points" to food systems in order to gauge the hazard levels at various points in the food supply continuum, for example, in the abbatoir postslaughter, in the processing plant pre-packaging. 36 , 37 The sampling plans put forward by the ICMSF were connected to this overall shift in microbial food safety, marked by a blending of qualitative with more quantitative approaches to food hygiene. It marked a shift where the meaning of safety became contested: the mere presence or absence of a microbe in a product did not make it (respectively) unsafe or safe as before. Instead, the application of a statistical approach to food hygiene meant that varying degrees of safety or risk could be assessed and expressed numerically. But beyond administrative and communication complaints, the main sticking point appeared to be over the two different food hygiene approaches, on the one hand pursuing the raw material throughout its journey, and on the other, defining the microbial counts in the final product, items which would go on the market ready for consumption. The crux of the issue was a phrase that appeared in most of the Codex Group's standards for the final product: "…that products should be free from any pathogen infectious to man and from any toxic substance originating from microorganisms". 41 The ICMSF strongly urged that simply describing the final product as "free from pathogens" was not enough; there had to be more rigorous numerical standards and methods for sampling. The WHO's position was that simple descriptive qualitative hygiene standards were "not scientifically correct". In a report describing the role of the food hygiene laboratory, they explained:
"The food hygiene laboratory can only give the microbial status of the food in relation to the sensitivity of the test used and with the consideration that tests can be used only for a limited range of pathogenic organisms. Further, the finding of no pathogens does not mean that such pathogens are absent from the food. They may not be found by the methods used. This caution is especially important since any other interpretation of microbiological data would lead to the impression that foods certified by a laboratory as pathogen-free did not contain pathogens, or might be so safe that subsequent care in handling could be disregarded. In order to maintain the scientific integrity of the food hygiene laboratory, the Committee recommends that no microbiological results be issued without a qualifying statement which indicates the exact number of samples examined in relation to the total lot in question, the quantity of sample, and the methods used."
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The WHO warning above does not entirely rule out vigilance at other points along the food chain, as it suggested that 'subsequent care' was still necessary to ensure safe food.
It clearly, however, supported the notion of sampling plans and the statistical approach.
But, what was at stake by endorsing statistical evidence? By pairing the language of 'scientific correctness' with the sampling plans, the WHO was implicitly linking scientific with statistical evidence (and thereby making qualitative descriptions a subordinate form of evidence). Given the international reach of the UN agencies, this specific application of a quantitative risk assessment to food marks a period in which debates about the type of evidence upon which food hygiene standards should be based reaches a global level. 43 This debate over the balance of quantitative and qualitative evidence is still occurring in food safety circles -particularly regarding the nature of risk and how to assess risk in food. The HACCP system has been "controversial" as it is a "semi-quantitative" in its approach to microbial food safety. 44 Food safety experts have recently labelled qualitative measures to be "non-transparent", whereas quantitative evidence, in the form of risk assessments similar to that being described here by the WHO and the ICMSF, has become synonymous with "transparent"
evidence. 45 This discussion over qualitative and quantitative measures for food safety standards, and their implications for industry and public health, appears to be rooted in the 1960s hygiene debates of the Codex.
By 1973, methods for salmonella isolation for eggs and egg products were of particular concern and a growing problem, and at this point another international group, the 
CONCLUSION
This is not a simplistic story of one approach reigning triumphantly over the other; this debate remains ongoing today and a qualitative approach to food safety system management was never completely replaced by a quantitative one. Qualitative aspects are retained in the HACCP system which was endorsed by the ICMSF in the 1980s 54 and also by the Codex Alimentarius in 1993, which gave HACCP worldwide currency as it spread as one of the most recognized and effective tools for food safety management. 55 , 56 The governance and management of food safety standards at the international level has only increased in complexity, however: although the origins of our modern global system of standards might be traced back to early groups such as the 22
Codex, ISO and ICMSF, many national and international standard schemes have developed, some which are merely variations on the same theme, and many of which attempt to translate these standards into useable formats for various sectors of industry, be it SMEs, retail or catering or for on-farm management.
This is neither a story of one standard triumphing over the other, however. Although the ICMSF remains a leading voice in the application of statistical sampling plans to food hygiene, the practicality of these sampling plans for application beyond the laboratory by inspectors or to the so called "farm-to-fork" continuum by food handlers remains questionable 40 years on as they are still "not fully understood" particularly in relation to other risk management approaches such as HACCP or Food Safety
Objectives. 57 Instead, in the wake of this historical debate and the subsequent globalization of food standards, the burden of practicality has shifted more toward industry and national public health departments of member states to find ways to integrate and make these standards more manageable and applicable to various contexts along the food production chain, and to find a blend of quantitative and qualitative ways of assessing and managing risks. For example, the Consumer Goods Forum, an independent global parity-based Consumer Goods network, has established the Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI) in 2000 which attempts to ensure equivalence between the various standards and auditing schemes to be used as benchmarks globally. On a national level, the U.K. Food Standards Agency has established schemes such as Safer Food Better Business (SFBB) aimed at the catering and retail sector.
This conflict between the FAO and WHO expert groups may represent a variation on a common theme since conflicts between experts, as Smith and Phillips have argued, seem so "widespread in food policy making and regulation that they might fairly be described as endemic." 58 It is problematic to say that one approach or the other was victorious in the global food safety system: this early clash of two approaches to food hygiene, marked by the rise of statistical applications toward microbiology, and the WHO's urge to shift away from focusing on standardizing human behaviour to the food product instead represents once again how the Codex standards shows (and future work on food safety management necessitates) a co-production of diverse elements. It is clearly necessary to find the common ground if we are to develop best practice approaches to food safety management. 
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